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UNITY OF USE AND UNITY OF OWNERSHIP IN
EMINENT DOMAIN
By JOHN R. REZZOLLA*
In eminent domain proceedings, the question frequently arises
as to whether property to be acquired is part of a single parcel or is
itself a separate and distinct tract. The significance of this consid-
eration emanates from the general rule that when part of a parcel
or tract is appropriated, payment must be made not only for the
part taken, but also for any damages resulting to the residue. This
rule does not apply, however, to injuries accruing to other separate
and independent parcels owned by the condemnee. 1
A distinction must be drawn, however, between consequential
damages to a remainder area where part of a tract is physically
appropriated and consequential damages to a tract no part of which
is physically appropriated. In the latter case, the damages must
be peculiar to such land and not be such as is suffered in common
with the general public. 2 In determining just compensation, for
the taking of a part of a tract of land consideration must be limited
to that tract alone, without regard to the effect upon any other
tract which has been used as, and is in fact, a separate and distinct
tract, even though it may be adjacent or even contiguous and in
the same ownership.3
The issue is thus raised as to what constitutes a single tract, as
* A.B., Catholic Univ.; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania; Assistant
Attorney General, Pennsylvania Highway Dep't (1947-1955); Deputy At-
torney General & Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Highway Dep't (1955- . );
member, Joint State Gov't Comm'n Advisory Committee on Eminent Do-
main Code; member, Legal Affairs Committee of Am. Ass'n of State High-
way Officials; member, Legal Committee of Highway Research Bd., Nat'l
Academy of Arts & Sciences. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent those of the Commonwealth.
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1. See Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. App. 760, 31 P.2d 467 (1934);
City of Quincy v. V. E. Best Plumbing & Heating Supply Co., 17 Ill.2d 570,
162 N.E.2d 373 (1959); Merchant v. Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 126 Atl. 884
(1924); Sasso v. Housing Authority of City of Providence, 82 R.I. 451, 111
A.2d 226 (1955).
2. 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 350 (1950).
3. United States v. Mills, 237 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1956).
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distinguished from a separate one. While there is no one rule or
principle for determining the unity of lands for purposes of award-
ing severance damages or offsetting benefits, the factors most gen-
erally emphasized are unity of use and unity of ownership.4 The
remainder of this article will analyze these two factors.
UNrrY OF USE
By application of the theory of unity of use two otherwise
separate and distinct properties may be regarded as one in the
assessment of severance damages. To invoke this doctrine success-
fully, it must be shown that the properties are so inseparably con-
nected in the use to which they are applied that the injury or de-
struction of one must necessarily and permanently injure the other.5
Mere devotion to a common purpose is not enough to fuse the
separate tracts; the parcels must form an integrated unit and be
used in conjunction with each other. Stated somewhat differently,
there must be such a connection or relation of adaption, conven-
ience, and actual and permanent use between them as to make the
enjoyment of the parcel taken reasonably and substantially neces-
sary to the enjoyment of the remaining parcel in the most advan-
tageous and profitable manner.
6
Contiguous Tracts
Ordinarily, and as a general proposition, actual contiguity or
physical connection between tracts is essential in order to create a
unit as a basis of awarding damages in condemnation where only a
part or all of one tract is taken. In addition, most jurisdictions re-
quire that there be a unity of use between the connected tracts.
In People v. Thompson7 the court reasoned that even though a lot is
actually contiguous to another tract from which a strip is con-
demned, where there is actual diversity of use the lot cannot be
considered as part of the tract for the purpose of serverance. Simi-
larly, in Baetjer v. United States,8 the court indicated that the
determination of whether condemned land is part of a single parcel
does not wholly depend upon contiguity, since contiguous tracts
may be separate ones if used separately.9
4. See Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 378,
109 S.E.2d 219 (1959).
5. See Potts v. Pennsylvania Schuylkill Valley R.R., 119 Pa. 278, 13
Atl. 291 (1888).
6. See Peck v. Superior Short Line R.R., 36 Minn. 343, 31 N.W. 217
(1887); see also State v. Jay Six Cattle Co., 88 Ariz. 97, 353 P.2d 185 (1960);
City of Menlo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal.2d 261, 311 P.2d 135 (1957); Kanne-
bec Water Dist. v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6 (1902).
7. 43 Cal.2d 13, 271 P.2d 507 (1954).
8. 143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944).
9. See McLennan County v. Stanford, 350 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1961),
wherein the court concluded that only when separate but contiguous tracts
are in such physical and functional relationship that they will be joined
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A contrary position, however, and certainly a minority view,
was taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Elgart v. Phila-
delphia, 10 wherein the court said:
We feel that the 'unity of use' doctrine should be limited to
situations involving non-contiguous land and not extend to
contiguous tracts. One does not have to be an expert in
real estate appraisals or an expert in land value economics
to recognize that, generally, whenever two contiguous and
independently owned parcels are acquired by a single own-
er, the valuation of the combined parcels may produce a
value greater than the sum of the values of the individual
parts. Even where there are no actual physical improve-
ments as increment of value [plottage value] arises as a
consequence of combining two or more sites, thereby devel-
oping a single site having a greater value than the aggregate
of each of them separately considered. There is a recog-
nized economic advantage in larger real estate holdings.
Substantial sums are paid by real estate developers for the
acquisition of larger plots of land because the advantage of
contiguous lots is always reflected by a larger square foot
value."
The court then proceeded, in effect, to overrule Gibson v. Fifth
Avenue & High St. Bridge Co.,' 2 in which it was held that taking
part of a contiguous parcel not devoted to a similar use did not
create a severance damage to the remaining property. The position
taken in Elgart will undoubtedly prove to be an expensive one for
Pennsylvania condemnors. When a percentage depreciation factor
is applied to a large remainder, the damages will obviously be
greater than would be the case if the remainder were smaller.
Moreover, the mere consideration of larger areas means greater ap-
praisal and engineering costs. It is to be hoped that subsequent
decisions will add some restrictions to the apparent blanket rule of
Elgart that all contiguous parcels must be considered as one.
Non-Contiguous Tracts
Before the turn of the century American courts were more
conservative with the tax dollar and the dollar of the utilities which
exercised the right of eminent domain. Most of the courts were
strict in requiring that if damages were to be attributed to residual
land of an owner, the land must be contiguous to that taken. Al-
though some cases still deny non-contiguous land severance dam-
ages, or at least demand very exacting proof of such damages, it
seems that the trend is to allow severance damages if unity of use
by unity of use by the same proprietor will they be treated as a whole in
assessing damages to the remainder for the taking of part. See also Lin-
coln v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 368, 41 N.E. 489 (1895); Guptill Holding
Corp. v. State, 20 App. Div. 2d 832, 247 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1964).
10. 395 Pa. 343, 149 A.2d 641 (1959).
11. Id. at 346-47, 149 A.2d at 643.
12. 192 Pa. 55, 43 Atl. 339 (1899).
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is proven. State courts seem to be abandoning the idea that there
must be actual proximity between the two tracts and are moving
closer to the rationale of the federal courts, which have stressed the
functional interdependence of lands, not their geographical rela-
tionship. Illustrative of this principle is Ives v. Kansas Turnpike
Authority.13 The court said:
Actual contiguity or physical connection, however, is not a
conclusive test. While actual contiguity or, if separated, the
distance between the tracts is an important element to con-
sider on the question of unity of use, nevertheless, in many
instances, depending upon the facts of a particular case, in-
tegrated use becomes the test whether two or more tracts
are to be considered as a unit. In other words, separation of
tracts is an evidentiary fact bearing upon, but not necessar-
ily determinative of, the ultimate issue.
14
In Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Commission,9 the
court recognized that while the general rule is that parcels of
land must be contiguous in order to constitute them a single tract,
there are exceptional cases where owners have been permitted to
include physically separate parcels in condemnation proceedings
and treat them as a unit. Likewise, in City of Denton v. Hunt,6 the
court noted that damages may be recovered in a condemnation suit
on noncontiguous lands so long as the parcels are devoted to a
single use, in physical proximity, and the public improvement is the
proximate cause of the damages. 7 Integrated use then, not physi-
cal contiguity, is the principle test to be used in determining
whether two parcels are to be considered as a unity. Physical con-
tiguity, of course, remains an important factor bearing upon unity,
the fact of separation being an evidentiary, if not operative, factor.
Present Use
It is generally held that the use relied on to establish this sin-
gleness of purpose must be a present one. Uses which are specula-
tive, remote, imaginary, or merely intended, cannot serve as a basis
for legal unification.18 Moreover, the mere possibility of adaptabil-
ity to different uses will not render segments of land separate and
independent. 19
In Darlington v. Pennsylvania R.R.20 the plaintiff owned farm-
land adjoining the Allegheny River. A railroad right of way run-
13. 184 Kan. 134, 334 P.2d 337 (1959).
14. Id. at 137, 334 P.2d at 339.
15. 250 N.C. 378, 109 S.E.2d 219 (1959).
16. 235 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1950).
17. See also Westbrook v. Muscatine R.R., 115 Iowa 106, 88 N.W.202
(1901); In re Lehigh R.R., 78 N.J.L. 699, 76 Atl. 1067 (1910).
18. See Arnerich v. Almaden Vineyards Corp., 52 Cal. App.2d 265, 126
P.2d 121 (1942).
19. See Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C.
378, 109 S.E.2d 219 (1959).
20. 278 Pa. 307, 123 Atl. 284 (1924).
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ning parallel to the river cut plaintiff's land into two parcels. The
land, as separated, had been used as an entirety for farming. There-
after, the railroad condemned all of plaintiff's parcel between the
right of way and the river. Plaintiff offered to prove that the
highest and best use of his entire tract was for a furnace and rolling
mill site. In rejecting this offer, the court held that the theory of
entirety must be predicated solely on present use. The court rea-
soned that when an owner claims damages based on a unified use,
he must have it presently within his power to make the use avail-
able, and if the use depends upon the affirmative action of others,
the land cannot be said to be presently useful for that purpose.
The logic of this position rests upon the fact that a future unified
use may never occur and therefor any measure of damages on
such a basis would be purely conjectural.
Pennsylvania's new eminent domain code 2' "codifies existing
case law" in this area, according to the official comment of the
drafting committee:
Where all or part of several contiguous tracts owned by
one owner is condemned or a part of several non-contiguous
tracts owned by one owner, which are used together for a
unified purpose is condemned, damages shall be assessed as
if such tracts were one parcel.
22
To the same effect as the Darlington case is Wagoner v. Arling-
ton.2"3 The condemnee attempted to try his case on the theory that
the highest and best use of his property, both as to that taken in
condemnation and as to the remaining land, was for residential
purposes and not the farming and ranching purpose to which the
same was devoted at the time the city's condemnation proceeding
was instituted. In holding that the condemnee was not entitled to
introduce evidence concerning the diminution in value of his re-
maining land after a part was taken, the court pointed out that
under the condemnee's theory there could be no proper claim of
unity between the land taken and the remainder. The court went
on to note that only under the theory that the land as held and
utilized was substantially destroyed or so diminished in utility
by the taking of a part that the value of the remaining land was
disproportionately reduced in value would the condemnee be en-
titled to damages. Such, however, was not the condemnee's theory
and evidence on damages.
24
In comparison, however, there are a few decisions which hold
that adaptability for future unity of use will suffice to unite other-
wise distinct tracts. The Baetjer court said that "tracts physically
separated from one another may constitute a single tract if put to
an integrated use or even if the possibility of their being so com-
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to 1-901 (Supp. 1965).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 605 (Supp. 1965).
23. 345 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1961).
24. See People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal.2d 406, 196 P.2d 570 (1948).
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bined in use in the reasonably near future" 25 was found to exist.
Moreover, in David Bradley Mfg. Co. v. Chicago & So. Traction
Co.26 the fact that a vacant lot was being held by a manufacturing
company with a view to expansion was accepted as ground for
considering it as part of the plant. Furthermore, in Oregon Ry. &
Nav. Co. v. Taffe 27 the court indicated that if the two adjoining
unoccupied lots were adapted to a single use and were of more value
because of such adaptation, they could be treated as one tract.
None of these cases is in accord with general principles. A pos-
sible explanation for this diversion might be that Baetjer was gov-
erned by federal requirement of just compensation to the person
whose property is taken. Moreover the vacant lots in the Bradley
and Taffe cases were actually contiguous to the property appropri-
ated. Even in light of these additional considerations, however, the
latter cases reflect the minority view on this issue, a view which is
surely unfavorable to condemnors. If it is permissible to unite
tracts on the basis of adaptability to future use, there would be
virtually no limit to the extent to which an owner could claim
serverance damages.
Question of Law or Fact
Generally, the question whether two or more parcels of land
constitute one tract for the purpose of assessing damages to the
portion not taken is one of law for the court.28 Such a considera-
tion often involves a statute or constitutional provision. When
there is a question of fact, depending on conflicting evidence or
different views of evidence, the courts will submit the question to
the jury.29 Some courts, however, view the matter as a factual
consideration and therefore submit the entire issue to the jury.30
Applications
No definite, comprehensive rules can be determined from the
cases as to what is necessary in order to prove a unitary use. This
is due to a lack of uniformity in state legislation and to differences
regarding the degree of proof deemed necessary to establish a sin-
gleness of purpose. Perhaps it is now necessary for the state legis-
latures to formulate definite rules. Despite these discrepancies,
however, it is possible to make a few generalizations from the
most common applications of the rule.
25. Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (lst Cir. 1944).
26. 229 Ill. 170, 82 N.E.210 (1907).
27. 67 Ore. 102, 134 Pac. 1024 (1913).
28. E.g., City of Chicago v. Equitable Assur, Soc'y, 8 Ill.2d 341, 134
N.E.2d 296 (1956).
29. E.g., Rath v. Sanitary Dep't No. 1 of Lancaster County, 156 Neb.
444, 56 N.W.2d 741 (1953).
30. E.g., Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L.R.R. v. Crockett, 182 Ind. 490, 106 N.E.




Lot Lines and Blocks
Generally, if the division of an owner's land into sections is
merely nominal, as by lots or section lines, the entire tract will be
considered as a single property. 1 Rath v. Sanitary Dep't No. 1 of
Lancaster County32 the court defined one contiguous tract or unit
as that which belongs to the same proprietor as that taken and is
contiguous with it and used together for a common purpose, ir-
respective of separation by platted or existing lines, lots, blocks,
streets, or like divisions.
In a condemnation proceeding for an elevated railway across a
block where the plaintiff owned all except eleven and one-half
lots, it was held that the court properly admitted evidence of dam-
ages to such lands as were merely separated by lot lines. 33 The
court noted that there was no physical obstruction between the
lots taken and those claimed to be injured, and that the sub-
division was merely for purposes of convenience in selling the prop-
erty. Similarly, in City of Stockton v. Marengo,34 the defendant
had platted his land into lots for future development but had con-
tinued to farm most of it as a unit. The court held that the unity
of use test was satisfied as to the part devoted to agriculture de-
spite separation by plat lines. In Alabama R.R. v. Musgrove,3 5 the
question was presented whether the delineation of supposed sub-
divisions upon a map should have the effect of limiting incidental
damages to a particular block shown upon such map. Upon a
showing that the tract was occupied as a whole and under one
fence, the court held that the entire tract should be treated as a
single parcel.
On the other hand, Wilcox v. St. Paul & N. P. R.R.,3 6 was held
that city lots not being put to any use, and not being actually occu-
pied, must be considered separate properties. The Wilcox rationale
was that the division into separate lots was presumably done for a
purpose and that such plat lines should not be ignored unless evi-
dence is brought forth to rebut a presumption of separateness.
This rule has been followed in three other states.37
The general rule appears to be that something more than mere
plotting of land upon a map is necessary in order to destroy the
unity of a particular tract. The rationale behind this position seems
to be that the act of plotting and laying off a tract into lots is
merely tentative, and that until another party intervenes the owner
31. Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Lineberry, 327 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. 1957).
32. 156 Neb. 444, 56 N.W.2d 741 (1953).
33. Metropolitan W. Side Elevated R.R. v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 434, 42 N.E.
871 (1896).
34. 137 Cal. 760, 31 P.2d 467 (1934).
35. 169 Ala. 424, 53 So. 1009 (1910).
36. 35 Minn. 439, 29 N.W. 148 (1886).
37. New York Municipal R.R. v. Weber, 179 App. Div. 245, 166 N.Y.S.
542 (1917), mod. on other grounds 226 N.Y. 70, 123 N.E. 68 (1919).
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can by his own volition change or destroy the plot, and continue the
integrity of the tract.38 If, however, the plotting is followed by a
corresponding physical change on the ground, sale of lots, or other
affirmative act by the owner, then lot entity might be established.
In Wellingron v. Boston & M. R.R.3 9 the plaintiff owned a number
of lots and properties platted from a farm-most of which had
long been in separate ownerships. The streets were opened and in
public use. Upon a taking of a number of these lots, it was de-
cided that no serverance damages were owing for the plaintiff's re-
maining land in the village.
40
A similar result was reached in New York Municipal R.R. v.
Weber.41 The land was not devoted to any special use. It had
been divided into blocks and lots upon a map by the owner of the
plot; and sales had been made with relation to streets shown on
the map. Hence, the property should prima facie be treated as lots
and blocks in ascertaining damages, and not as an entire tract.
An opposite view was taken in Peck v. Bristol42 wherein a
tract was treated as one even though some lots had been sold. To
the same effect is Cox v. Pennsylvania Co. 43 in which plaintiff
owned parcels A and B, which were separated by a railroad right
of way. Part of B was laid out for building lots, a number of
which had been sold and buildings erected thereon. Most of A and
B, however, was being used as farmland. When the railroad wid-
ened its existing right of way, the defendant argued that parcel B
should be valued separately because of its separate use. In con-
cluding that the tract should be valued as a whole, the court said
that in view of the use of both tracts primarily as farmland, neither
the laying out of some lots nor the sale of such lots operated as a
severance of the lots from the larger tract. It has been held that
the owner's right to severance damages was not affected by the fact
that one of the platted streets had been used by the public. 44
In some cases, the ownership of the fee in the right of way
separating the tract of lots has been a distinguishing factor.4.5 In
Bristol the fee in the right of way was in the owner. The two tracts
were considered as one property. In other cases, deviation of title
or the fact that the plat plan was not recorded may be important.
Generally, however, no reliable rule can be formulated to establish
what steps are necessary in order to destroy the entirety of platted
38. See Monogahela W. Penn Pub. Serv. Co. v. Monogahela Develop-
ment Co., 101 W. Va. 165, 132 S.E. 380 (1926); see generally NICHOLS, EMI-
NENT DOMAiN § 14.31 (3d ed. 1950).
39. 158 Mass. 185, 33 N.E. 393 (1893).
40. Id. at 187, 33 N.E. at 394.
41. 179 App. Div. 245, 166 N.Y.S. 542 (1917).
42. 74 Conn. 483, 51 Atl. 521 (1902).
43. 263 Pa. 132, 106 Atl. 70 (1919).
44. Middlesboro v. Chasteen, 285 Ky. 487, 148 S.W.2d 295 (1941).




lots. But in those cases in which unity of use between two or more
platted lots can be shown, there is general agreement that the par-
cels should be treated as one. A parcel may consist of contiguous
tracts, shown on official maps as lots, blocks, sections, or subdivi-
sions of sections, but if they constitute an entire parcel used for
one general purpose, damages should be assessed to the entire
property.
46
Conversely, unity is generally destroyed when it can be shown
that the lots are occupied by separate dwellings devoted to different
uses. Similarly, a partition wall dividing a building occupying
several contiguous lots, with different tenants, may be enough to
sever the damages. 47 Moreover, in Reilly v. Manhattan Ry.48 the
court held that where a building was situated on two lots on the
corner of a street, damages for the taking of the side street by an
elevated railroad company should be limited to that part of the
building adjacent to the street railroad. In this case there was a
partition wall in the building, both sides of which were used for
stores and apartments. A like result has been reached when there
are disconnected buildings, not dependent upon the same easement
and not used as a unit.
49
Farm Lands Separated by Artificial Barriers
The fact that two or more tracts are separated by a street,
highway, canal, or railroad does not preclude their being treated as
a single property, provided there is mutual access between them and
they are being used as an entirety. In some jurisdictions, however,
the issue of separateness of the several tracts is avoided by recog-
nizing that when the fee in the right of way remains in the owner,
the tracts are to be considered as contiguous and thus as a single
parcel.50 It follows that proof that the properties are being em-
ployed together may not be necessary. In the majority of cases,
however, contiguity is considered destroyed by such man-made bar-
riers, thereby raising the issue of identity of use.
Cameron v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R.R.,51 is illustrative of tracts
separated by a canal. Plaintiff's farm was in two tracts, separated
by a canal over which a bridge had been built and maintained by
the Commonwealth. Defendant appropriated a strip of land for
railroad purposes extending northerly across the easterly end of
plaintiff's farm. The railroad company contended plaintiff was not
46. See Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Goodwine, 228 S.W.2d 925
(Tex. 1950).
47. Keene v. Metropolitan Elevated R.R., 79 Hun. 451, 29 N.Y.S. 971
(1894).
48. 59 N.Y.S. 335 (1899).
49. Mooney v. New York Elevated R.R., 16 Daly 145, 9 N.Y.S. 522
(1890).
50. See Peck v. Bristol, 74 Conn. 483, 51 Atl. 521 (1902), Cleveland
C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. Smith, 177 Ind. 524, 97 N.E. 164 (1928).
51. 157 Pa. 617, 27 Atl. 668 (1893).
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entitled to recover for the injury or depreciation of the westerly
end of the farm because of the separation of the tract from the east-
erly portion by the canal. Upon a showing that the farm had al-
ways been held, occupied and cultivated as one tract of land, the
court concluded that the tracts constituted one single farm. The
court reasoned that it was never contemplated by the legislation
under which canals were constructed that the appropriation of a
strip through or across any farm should have the effect of discon-
necting one single farm into two separate and distinct farms or
tracts. It has also been held that damages should include deprecia-
tion to property abutting the other side of the canal, since both
unity of use and access between the two separate tracts was shown
to exist.
5 2
On the other hand, in Bergen Neck R.R. v. Point Breeze Ferry
Improv. Co. 53 the court held that it was error, in condemnation of
one tract, to consider damages caused to the other tract separated
by a canal. Access across the canal had ceased to exist because the
draw bridge had fallen and was not repaired. In Lough v. Minnea-
polis & St. L. R.R. 54 a farm consisting of several tracts was separated
by a highway. The court held that severance damages were owing
to the landowner for injuries sustained because of a condemnation
for a railroad. The court reaffirmed the doctrine that, if land is not
contiguous, but is separated by a road or highway, severance dam-
age is permitted if there is a unity of use. A tract of nearly eight
hundred acres, if owned and used as an entirety, is to be considered
as one property though crossed by several highways. 55
When the highway is a limited access highway, however, unity
of use may be more difficult to prove, since access between the
separated parcels will be restricted. In many cases this problem is
circumvented by showing access through a structure, large drainage
pipe or "cow pass," which the condemnor has provided in the first
instance in order to reduce condemnation costs.
The problem of access is even more acute when a railroad is
the disconnected factor. Unlike the case of a highway, the owners
may or may not have the right to cross and recross the tracts.
Furthermore, the owner is less likely to own the fee in the travers-
ing strip. Despite these differences, however, if the parcels on each
side of the railroad are inseparably linked in use, they will be
considered as one for the purpose of assessing severance damages.
6
52. In re Boston, 31 Hun. (N.Y.) 461 (1884).
53. 57 N.J.L. 163, 30 Atl. 584 (1894).
54. 89 N.W. 77 (Iowa 1902). See City of Stockton v. Mills & Sons, Inc.,
165 F. Supp. 554 (1958).
55. See St. Louis, M. & S. E. R.R. v. Drummond Realty & Investment
Co., 205 Mo. 167, 103 S.W. 977 (1907).
56. See Chicago & E. RR. v. Hoffman, 67 Ind. App. 281, 119 N.E. 169
(1918); Paulson v. State Highway Comm'n, 210 Iowa 651, 231 N.W. 296
(1930); Darlington v. Pennsylvania, R.R., 278 Pa. 307, 123 Atl. 284 (1924).
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In State v. Williams57 an owner's land was taken by the state
for the construction of a controlled-access interstate expressway
and a subsidiary service road. The land had been divided into two
parts by a railroad right of way across the northern portion of the
property. In holding that the owner was entitled to severance dam-
ages to both parcels, the court reasoned that a railroad running
through a large tract devoted to one purpose did not necessarily
divide it into two independent parcels when the owner possessed
the legal right to cross the intervening strip of land.
Moreover, in Chicago & P. R.R. v. Hildebrand5 8 a railroad had
condemned a strip across a tract, severing the land. It subsequently
sought to condemn another strip for constructing an additional
track on one side only. In holding that the lands should be treated
as one, the court noted that the farm may still be used, by means of
crossings, as a unit, and therefore an injury to one part is an injury
to the whole.
When there is no evidence of any means of passage to connect
the severed tracts, however, damages cannot be recovered for any
depreciation to the divided land not taken. As noted in Kansas
City, M. & 0 .R.R. v. Littler,5 9 parcels of land separated by a public
highway, but used together, may be treated as one tract, because
the highway affords rightful passage between them. The interven-
tion of lands across which the owner has no such right, however,
would be a barrier to recovery of severance damage to the separated
parcel.
Tracts Separated by Natural Barriers
Generally, much of what has been said regarding division of
tracts by artificial barriers applies to tracts separated by natural
features such as a watercourse or the intervening land of another.
Both unitary use and accessibility between tracts are necessary in
order to rebut the issue of separateness raised by the physical divi-
sion. In addition, physical proximity is also a major factor, par-
ticularly where the separation is by land of another private owner.
In cases in which the separation is wrought by a stream or
creek, proof that the tracts are employed together for a single pur-
pose and that there is a means of intercourse between them will
usually rebut any presumption of distinctness. 60 When the division
is by a large body of water, however, such as a river or a lake, a
different result may occur. In such cases, there is usually a present
identity of use. The question is whether the separation of the
properties is enough to make them different properties despite that
57. 131 So. 2d 600 (La. 1961).
58. 136 Il. 467, 27 N.E. 69 (1891).
59. 79 Kan. 545, 100 Pac. 282 (1909).
60. See Atchinson & N. R.R. v. Gough, 29 Kan. 67 (1882); State v.
Hobblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288 Pac. 181 (1930); Kossler v. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St.
L. Ry., 208 Pa. 50, 57 AtI. 66 (1904).
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use. In St. Louis, M. & S. E. R.R. v. Aubuchon6 an island separated
from the mainland by a channel of water which varied in width up
to two hundred yards was held to be an independent parcel though
used in connection with a farm. In Baetjer, however, the United
States took part of an island seventeen miles from the docks of the
condemnee's sugar mill. The island was used to grow cane for the
mill. In spite of this extent of non-contiguity, unity of use was
proved.
62
When the separation is by the intervening land of another, the
distance factor again becomes significant. In United States v. 561.14
Acres of Land63 the court noted that contiguity was not the absolute
test as a matter of law. Nevertheless, the distance separating the
two tracts was to be considered as an evidentiary factor. Similarly,
in Ives v. Kansas Turnpike Authority64 the court indicated that dis-
tance between the tracts was an important element to be con-
sidered.
That the tracts are separated and located at a distance from
each other, however, will not necessarily prevent them from being
treated as one if it can be shown that the properties are inseparably
connected in use and that a permissive right of way existed across
the intervening land. The Ives court noted:
Where two or more tracts of land in proximity and under
the same ownership are not contiguous or physically con-
nected, even though separated by privately owned land of
another, they may be considered as a unit . . . despite the
fact that the taking is from only one of the tracts, provided
the use to which they are applied is so inseparably con-
nected that the taking from one necessarily and in fact in-
jures the other.
65
The right of way across the intervening land, in turn, must be
something more than a mere license, otherwise the right to cross
could be terminated at any time. 66
Business and Commercial Tracts
The unity of use doctrine has been applied in many cases in-
volving the taking of a part of an industrial or manufacturing
plant. In many instances the various operations of an industry may
be spread out over a wide area, and the taking of a small but vital
61. 199 Mo. 352, 97 S.W. 867 (1906).
62. Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944).
63. 206 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
64. 184 Kan. 134, 334 P.2d 399 (1959).
65. Id. at 145, 334 P.2d at 407. See People v. Bowers, 38 Cal. 238, 226
Cal. App.2d 463 (1964); Westbrook v. Muscatine N. & S. R.R., 115 Iowa 106,
88 N.W. 202 (1901); State v. Bradshaw Land & Livestock Co., 99 Mont. 95,
43 P.2d 674 (1935).
. 66. See Westbrook v. Muscatine, N. & S. R.R., supra note 65; Leven-
worth, R.R. v. Wilkins, 45 Kan. 674, 26 Pac. 16 (1891); State v. Bradshaw
Land & Livestock Co., supra note 65.
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part of an integrated operation may result in a considerable im-
pairment to the remainder. In some extreme cases the taking of a
portion of one parcel has resulted in virtual destruction of the en-
tire enterprise. Nevertheless, the same test for unity has generally
been applied. While there are a number of cases which suggest a
deviation from the general rules, no definite exception has been
established.
Kennebac Water Dist. v. Waterville'7 is illustrative of a liberal
view in this regard. The court allowed damages to an entire plant
located in different parts of the city on account of the taking of a
part of the operation. No damages, however, were allowed to sep-
arate and distinct power plants and transmission systems in other
cities which were made less effective because of increased manage-
ment costs. The inference is generally accepted that there must be
more than a mere unification of management.
In a New York case, a consolidated gas company owned two
pieces of land in different blocks. One had been acquired by the
consolidation of the predecessor companies. On this latter tract
there was a plant for making coal gas which had not been in use for
several years. It was maintained as a reserve for any exigency that
might arise. The plant on the other tract was used for making
water gas. The land covered by the coal gas plant was condemned.
The court held that damage to the entire plant, as a whole, on both
blocks, should be allowed.
68
In Potts v. Pennsylvania S. Valley R.R.6 9 plaintiffs were in the
business of quarrying, shipping and selling marble. The quarry
land was a mile distant from the land used for shipping. The ship-
ping land was separated from the land used for selling by many
miles. A portion of the shipping land was condemned. Plaintiffs
claimed damage to all three parcels of land. In rejecting this claim
the court held, however, that mere economic integration was insuf-
ficient to unite the three parcels:
An extensive business partnership may conduct a variety of
operations, as distinct in their character as the location of
its various departments; and if their different and discon-
nected properties are to be regarded as one property be-
cause they are used in one business, theassessment of dam-
ages for right of way would become liable to such complica-
67. 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6 (1902).
68. In re Mayor of New York, 39 App. Div. 589, 57 N.Y.S. 657 (1899).
When the property consisted of several lots in different blocks, on which
were located machinery, buildings, dryhouse, sheds, and kilns, and the en-
tire piece had been occupied for years as a brickyard, and was used as one
tract of land for a common purpose, it was held that damages should be
allowed to the whole. Kansas City Suburban Belt R.R. Co. v. Norcross, 137
Mo. 415, 38 S.W. 299 (1896). See New York R.R. v. Bell, 28 Hun. (N.Y.)
426 (1882); Essex Storage Elec. Co. v. Victory Lumber Co., 93 Vt. 437, 108
Atl. 426 (1919).
69. 119 Pa. 278, 13 Atl. 291 (1888).
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tion as would greatly embarrass the administration of the
law in this form of proceeding. 0
In Sgarlat Estate v. Commonwealth7' the Commonwealth con-
demned land from which sand and gravel were extracted. The
sand and gravel were taken to land more than three miles away to
be washed. In denying severance to this latter land which was not
taken, the court said:
The two parcels may form a business unit for the mo-
ment, but either could, with some adjustment, go on func-
tioning without the other, and the appellant's primary
thrust is more at business damage than at land damage.7 2
There is a conflict concerning the degree of integration required
in order to consider the non-contiguous counterparts of an enter-
prise as a single property. In some jurisdictions it would seem that
if the properties are actively serving a common purpose, then this
is sufficient to unite them. In others, mere economic integration is
not enough. Certainly the former view has merit in that it is
oriented toward a fuller and more complete compensation to the
condemnee. Nevertheless, if condemnation costs are to be kept
within reasonable limits, something more than incidental business
unity must be required in order to warrant severance damages to
separate parcels not taken.
UNITY OF OWNERSHIP
The second test, unity of ownership, requires that a parcel, in
order to be considered part of the residue, must be held under the
same ownership as the parcel from which there is a taking.73
Many courts, while recognizing the rule requiring unity of owner-
ship, have not spelled out clearly what is needed in order to satisfy
the requirement. Some courts have taken the position that both
parcels must be solely and exclusively owned by the condemnee.7 4
One court indicated that the quality and quantity of estate or
interest is all that is needed.7 5 Others hold that unity of ownership
70. Id. at 286, 13 Atl. at 293. See Quincy v. V. E. Best Plumbing &
Heating Supply Co., 17 Ill.2d 570, 162 N.E.2d 373 (1959), wherein mill prop-
erty was not contiguous to the lumberyard property which was sought to
be condemned. In refusing to permit damages to the mill property not
taken, the court indicated that the fact that the properties were convenient
and beneficial to one another was not enough to warrant considering them
as a single property.
71. 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541 (1960).
72. Id. at 411, 158 A.2d at 544.
73. See United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172 (1950);
Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98 (1932); Board of County Comm'r
v. Morgan, 324 P.2d 268 (Okl. 1958). See generally annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 890
(1964).
74. E.g., United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., note 73 supra; State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Esselman, 179 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1944).
75. Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 378,
109 S.E.2d 219 (1959).
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need not always exist where the owner of one parcel has a certain
right or interest, although short of ownership, in the other parcel.7 6
Conversely, it is the rule in virtually all jurisdictions that adjoining
parcels owned by different parties may not be united as one tract
for the purpose of showing greater severance damages.
77
Applications
A. When Owner of One Part Holds Other Part Under Co-tenancy
or Tenancy by the Entireties
It has been held that unity of ownership necessary for the
allowance of severance damages does not exist if the owner of one
part holds the other part under co-tenancy or tenancy by the entire-
ties.78 Glendenning v. Stahley7 9 is the leading case on this issue.
A husband owned an eighty acre tract north of the proposed road.
A twenty acre tract lying immediately south of the said road was
owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. The two
tracts were used in conjunction with each other for farming pur-
poses. The parties attempted to show the value of the two tracts
as a whole but their testimony was excluded by the trial court.
The court affirmed the lower court:
Claims for damages in proceedings of this character are per-
sonal, and must be asserted in the names of the actual
owner of the lands affected. One person may not recover
damages sustained by another, and manifestly special dam-
ages suffered by one proprietor could not be compensated
by benefits accruing to another.8 0
In Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n,8 1 how-
ever, the court indicated that it is not a requisite for unity of own-
ership that a party have the same quantity and quality of interest
or estate in all parts of the tract. The court noted that if there are
tenants in common, one or more of the tenants must own some
interest or estate in the entire tract. It should be noted that the
requirement of holding under identical title, which seems to be the
majority view on this issue, does not require identical derivation
76. E.g., Board of Comm'r v. Labore, 37 Kan. 480, 15 Pac. 577 (1887);
Jonas v. State, 19 Wis.2d 638, 121 U.W.2d 235 (1963).
77. E.g., Williams v. Wallace, 316 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1958); Coatsworth
v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 73 Misc. 645, 131 N.Y.S. 300 (1911).
78. In Henner v. State, 32 Misc.2d 333, 224 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1962), a
wife owned a parcel of ground and her husband was a tenant on this parcel.
The parcel was condemned. An adjoining parcel was owned by the husband
and wife as tenants by the entireties. The parcels were used as one in the
operation of a summer bungalow colony. No part of the parcel owned by
the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties was taken. With respect
to the untouched parcel, the court held that the wife could recover sever-
ance damages to it only to extent of her interest therein.
79. 173 Ind. 674, 91 N.E. 234 (1910).
80. Id. at 679, 91 N.E. at 238. See Tillman v. Lewisburg & N. R.R.,
133 Tenn. 554, 182 S.W. 597 (1916).
81. 250 N.C. 378, 109 S.E.2d 219 (1959).
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of title. Thus, where two tracts are held in fee by the same person
but are held under different deeds from different grantors, the
unity of title rule is satisfied.
B. When Owner of One Parcel Has Right to Use Other Parcel
Under Lease or Other Contract
In some cases the courts have held or indicated that where the
owner of one parcel has the right to use the other parcel under a
lease or other contract, and the two parcels have been used together
as a unit for a common purpose, the condemnee is entitled to recover
damages for injury to his interest in the condemned or remaining
land resulting from the condemnation. In Chicago & E.R.R. v.
Drese 1,2 the condemnee operated a flower gardening business on a
tract of land. Part of the land was owned by him in fee and the
remaining part was held under a lease. Plaintiff contended that he
was entitled to recover damages resulting from a separation of the
tract by the condemnation. The court agreed holding that damages
should be assessed to the entire property even though the portion
taken was held under a leasehold and the remainder in fee.
8 3
In State ex rel. La Prade v. Carrow8 4 a portion of the remaining
land was held under a lease. The owners of certain land condemned
for highway purposes recovered damages to adjoining lands which,
together with the condemned land, had been used and operated by
them as a unit for cattle business. The court indicated that even
though title varied both in quality and quantity, it was fairly within
the terms of the governing statute. Because the assessment of
damages did not comply with another provision in the same statute,
however, the judgment in favor of the condemnees was reversed.
On the other hand, in United States v. Honolulu Plantation
Co.8 5 a plantation company had extensive land interests including
some owned in fee, the majority leased, and some used by the com-
pany under oral agreement with the fee owner. In denying the
company's claim for severance damages allegedly resulting from
loss of value of its land by the condemnation of adjoining parcels,
the court said:
It is the estates in the separate parcels which must be con-
nected. If, therefore, the fee owner of one tract holds a les-
82. 110 Ill. 89 (1884).
83. See Jonas v. State, 19 Wis.2d 638, 121 N.W.2d 235 (1963);
We might well agree that an owner of one parcel [not taken] who
has used it, and has a right under lease or other contract to con-
tinue to use it, as a unit with the parcel taken would be entitled
to severance damages and the condemnor would be compelled to
pay such damage in addition to the value of the part taken, consid-
ered separately.
Id. at 643, 121 N.W.2d 238. Recovery of severance damages was denied
because of insufficiency of evidence to show that the owner of the remain-
ing land had any lease or other contractual right to use the condemned land.
84. 57 Ariz. 429, 114 P.2d 891 (1941).
85. 182 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1950).
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ser tenure in the tract taken, there can be no additional
compensation for this reason. The explanation is that the
fee is the integer. The condemnor takes the particular
ground. The whole structure of rights imposed upon
this ground are destroyed. Of course, a lease upon one
parcel of land cannot be a part of the fee simple of another
parcel.8 6
The court then went on to state that from earliest times in federal
condemnations, additional compensation has been refused where the
owner of the fee of one tract had a lease upon another parcel held
in fee by a third party, when the leasehold alone was taken.
This position represents the majority view.8 7 It would seem to
be based on financial expediency. Many industrial and commercial
firms have farflung businesses tied together by numerous property
investments ranging from ownership in fee simple to tenancy from
month to month. The condemnation of one property interest, ac-
cording to this view, should not result in an entire business enter-
prise being appraised. Otherwise, the sovereign, in taking property
for public use, would be subjected to almost limitless severance dam-
age based on inconvenience, business loss and prospects yet un-
born. s8
Miscellaneous Situations
There are a number of other applications of the rule which war-
rant mentioning because of the frequency of their occurrence. One
such instance occurs when the owner of one part has an option to
purchase the other tract. Under such facts, it has been held that a
mere option to purchase land being condemned did not constitute
an interest in land and therefore the claimant was not entitled to
severance damages, as concerned the optioned land. If, instead of
an option, there had been a binding contract to purchase, the result
may have been different.8 9
Similarly, when the owner of one part has a future interest in
the other part, the uncertainty as to when the condemnee would
enter into the enjoyment of his vested interest, prevents any con-
sideration of severance to the future interest parcel.90 If there is
partnership property held in the names of some or all of the part-
ners, however, it has been held that "in view of equity it is imma-
terial in whose name the legal title to the property stands, whether
in the name of one partner or the names of all."91
86. Id. at 179. See Kohl v. United States 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
87. E.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Bloom, 77 S.D. 452, 93 N.W.2d 572
(1958).
88. See United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172 (9th
Cir. 1950).
89. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v. Kieffer, 99 Cal. App. 240, 278
Pac. 476 (1929).
90. Conness v. Indiana, I & I. R.R., 193 Ill. 464, 62 N.E. 221 (1901).
91. Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 275 Pac. 228 (1929).
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Another situation, and one somewhat similar to the leasing
arrngement occurs when there is a condemnation involving min-
eral lands. Not infrequently, such lands are comprised of several
contiguous tracts in which the mining rights only, have been
leased. In some jurisdictions this lease may convey to the lessee an
interest equivalent to a fee in the mineral, depending upon the
terms of the lease. Such being the case, the fact that the fee in the
surface remains in a different party or parties precludes recovery
of severance damages to several leased parcels when part of only
one of them is taken. Nevertheless, Ferguson v. Pittsburgh & S.
R.R.9 2 resulted in a decision to the opposite effect. Here, the con-
demnee owned two tracts of land, A and C, and leased the mineral
rights to a strip of land, tract B, which joined them. The same coal
vein ran through all three tracts and the court used this as a basis
for assessing severance damages to B and C although the actual take
was limited to a portion of tract A. The authority of the case is
limited, however, since the fact that the condemnee only leased the
mineral rights to tract B was never discussed in the Court's opin-
ion, nor was the point raised by the condemnor in attempting to
mitigate damages.
CONCLUSION
Generally, where two otherwise distinct properties are so situ-
ated that they are used together as a unit, and each is dependent
upon the other, the parcels may be treated as one, so that a taking of
a part or all of one will be treated as a partial taking of the com-
bined whole. This seems to be the general rule whether applied to
farm or city property, or to an industrial plant. Government sub-
divisions, section lines, and plat lines are of no consequence if the
property is contiguous and used as one tract. So also, the fact that
properties are separated by artificial, natural, or intervening land
interests of another, thereby rendering them non-contiguous,
will not preclude a finding of unity where it can be convincingly
demonstrated that each parcel is a necessary adjunct of the other.
But where the use is only intended, or if the several pieces can be
separated without affecting the value of the other, damages will be
limited to the particular piece taken or injured.
Unity of ownership, like unity of use, is generally considered
to be a prerequisite to the allowance of severance damages; thus,
damages to contiguous or non-contiguous property belonging to a
third party cannot be recovered. But where the owner of one
part has some interest less than full and complete ownership in the
other, there is a conflict of authority as to whether the rule is
satisfied. Some courts say that it has fulfilled the requirement;
others say that there must be the same quantity and quality of
ownership, and yet others take the position that unity of ownership
92. 253 Pa. 581 (1916).
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need not always exist. Beyond this, as in so many areas of the law,
few sweeping generalizations can be made. Each case will depend
upon its facts and on the law peculiar to the jurisdiction in which it
is litigated.
